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Abstract
The term “social cognition” generally refers to the mental operations that underlie social interactions including the perception and 
interpretation of the intentions, dispositions, and behaviors of others and the generation of a response to these behaviors. Social 
cognition has been considered a valuable and promising field that strives to understand the nature and outcome of major mental 
disorders. This article discusses the concept of social cognition and its relationship to Theory of Mind (ToM). Theory of Mind in 
autistic spectrum disorders has been studied since the 1980s, and cognitive impairments in these disorders may be restricted to 
ToM deficits because other cognitive domains and nonsocial intelligence are preserved. This article addresses the issues of human 
ontogeny, reviews the main findings from research on schizophrenia and bipolar disorder, and summarizes the tools commonly used 
in the assessment of these illnesses. Keywords: social cognition, Theory of Mind, bipolar disorder, schizophrenia.
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Introduction
The term “social cognition” has various meanings, 
but it generally refers to the mental operations that 
underlie social interactions including the perception 
and interpretation of the intentions, dispositions, and 
behaviors of others, and the generation of a response to 
these behaviors (Green et al., 2008). Social cognitive 
processes in humans describe the ways individuals draw 
inferences about other people’s beliefs and the ways they 
weigh social situational factors in making these inferences 
(Green et al., 2008). Although social cognition is a 
valuable and promising field that attempts to understand 
the nature and outcomes of major mental disorders, lack 
of agreement on the myriad of terms, definitions, and 
measurements associated with this field creates problems 
for theorists. Moreover, as Macrae (2001) indicated in his 
work, social cognition is one of the most studied themes 
in current experimental psychology research.
Among the confusion in the literature about the various 
terms associated with social cognitive theory, the Theory 
of Mind (ToM) is one of the most discussed. It refers to 
the ability to infer mental states (e.g., beliefs, desires, 
intentions, imagination, emotions) that cause actions. An 
individual with a ToM is able to reflect on the content of 
his/her own and others’ minds (Baron-Cohen, 2001). 
Because social cognition and ToM belong to a special 
cognitive domain that directly reflects the interactions 
within a social environment, thus affecting quality of life, 
we can hypothesize that these functions are compromised 
in the case of mental illnesses characterized by cognitive 
impairments or disabilities (e.g., schizophrenia and 
bipolar disorder) (Couture, 2011). The study of cognition 
in major psychiatric disorders is an important research 
topic, but there is a paucity of available literature that 
meticulously addresses these issues.
Methods and objectives
We present a narrative review that focuses on 
social cognition and its relationship to ToM, clarifying 
the ambiguity in the concepts in the literature. Another 
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objective is to discuss the tendencies in the assessment 
of ToM and to review the populations (i.e., ages, species, 
psychopathologies) with impairments in this ability.
Social cognition and Theory of Mind
Three broad fields of knowledge appear to cover 
everything humans can know or conceive of knowing. The 
first is knowledge of the nonsocial environment, consisting 
of inanimate objects that do not interact. The second and 
third areas are the knowledge of others’ minds and our 
own. Humans share neurobiological and psychological 
mechanisms with other mammalian species; however, the 
abilities that arise from the knowledge of our own mind 
are much more refined (Adolphs, 2009). 
Social cognition refers to the cognitive processes 
related to the perception and interpretation of the 
stimuli around us to develop the knowledge we have 
about our own mind and others’ minds. One way to 
address the major themes and findings across areas of 
social cognitive research is to divide these domains into 
the understanding of others (e.g., ToM, empathy), self-
understanding (e.g., visual self-recognition, agency), 
self-control (e.g., impulse control, reappraisal), and 
the interface between self and others. The current 
theory of these processes proposes a dichotomous 
scheme. On one end of the spectrum are responses that 
are exclusively controlled, conscious, and deliberate 
(e.g., self-reflection). On the other end of the spectrum 
are the responses that are automatic, unintentional, 
and unconsidered (e.g., feeling rejected). Between 
these extremes are processes that engage or mediate 
controlled and automatic responses (e.g., reappraisal, 
ToM) (Lieberman, 2007). Emotional regulation, for 
example, often involves the initiation of new emotional 
responses or the alteration of ongoing responses through 
volitional regulatory actions that are used to influence 
the regulatory process. Failures to adaptively regulate 
emotional responses can be related to some psychiatric 
disorders (Ochsner & Gross, 2005).
The term “Theory of Mind” was originally proposed 
in a seminal article from the late 1970s by primatologists 
Premack and Woodruff (1978) who suggested that 
chimpanzees may be capable of inferring the mental 
states of others from the same species. During the last 
two decades of the 20th century, the concept was adopted 
to explain behavioral symptoms in autistic spectrum 
disorders (Baron-Cohen, Leslie, & Frith, 1985) and 
schizophrenia (Frith, 1992). Today it is known as the 
ability to reason the mental states and emotions of other 
persons (Fernyhough, 2008). 
The ontogeny of ToM faculties does not differ 
greatly from the maturation of other brain functions. The 
ability to appreciate one’s own and others’ mental states 
follows a distinct sequence of acquisition (Brüne & 
Brüne-Cohrs, 2006). In the early months of life, infants 
primarily engage in dyadic, face-to-face interactions. 
By the second month, they begin to focus on the eyes 
and mouths of other people and become distressed 
when others pose a “still face” and cease interacting 
with them. At the end of the first year, infants develop 
joint attention and are able to engage in triadic person-
object-person interactions (Striano & Reid, 2006). The 
typical 24-month-old child can engage in “pretend play” 
using skills to understand that the other person knows 
he/she is just pretending. By 3 years of age, a normal 
child can understand that merely touching a box is not 
enough to know what is inside. At the age of 4 years, 
typical children pass the “false belief” test, recognizing 
when someone has a false belief about the world. Not 
until 9 years of age does the typical infant recognize 
faux pas, what may hurt others’ feelings and what may, 
therefore, be better left unspoken (Baron-Cohen, 2008). 
Evidence suggests that the social brain continues its 
functional development during adolescence, a period 
characterized by social change, heightened self-
consciousness, increased importance and complexity 
of peer relationships, and improved understanding of 
others (Blakemore, 2008).
The modular perspective of the ontogeny of ToM 
hypothesizes that its development depends on the 
neurological maturation of the involved brain regions. 
Experience may activate ToM mechanisms, but it does 
not determine its structure. This perspective implies 
the static and inflexible development of this cognitive 
ability (Brüne & Brüne-Cohrs, 2006). Data support 
the theory that the extent and nature of the social 
interaction that children experience may influence the 
development of their social understanding (Carpendale 
& Lewis, 2004). Two other hypothetical models (i.e., 
metarepresentational theory and simulation theory) 
propose a greater role for experience in the development 
of individual ToM abilities, but these theories place less 
importance on intrinsic nervous system maturation 
(Brüne & Brüne-Cohrs, 2006).
Still unknown is whether humans have truly 
unique cognitive properties. Experts recognize aspects 
of imitation, ToM, language, and consciousness in 
other primates. This possibility would mean that these 
human abilities result not from qualitative differences 
but from the combination and improvement of these 
abilities. Functional brain imaging studies in humans 
have identified cortical areas related to empathy, 
ToM, imitation, and the distinction between self and 
others (Roth & Dicke, 2005). Although this evidence 
suggests the existence of brain structures specialized in 
processing social information in contrast to the idea that 
ToM would emerge from processes of other cognitive 
domains, evidence on this matter remains inconclusive.
Social cognition and major psychiatric disorders
Theory of mind in autistic spectrum disorders has 
been studied since the 1980s, and cognitive impairments in 
Major psychiatric disorders, social cognition and Theory of Mind 349
these disorders may be restricted to ToM deficits because 
other cognitive domains and nonsocial intelligence are 
preserved (Baron-Cohen, 2001). Classic autism and 
Asperger’s syndrome share three core diagnostic features: 
(i) difficulties in social and communicative development, 
(ii) unusually strong, narrow interests, and (iii) repetitive 
behavior (Baron-Cohen, 2008). 
In 1992, Frith proposed that the formal thought 
disturbances observed in schizophrenia, a core 
psychopathological cluster of this disorder, may 
be related to ToM deficits (Frith, 1992). Because 
bipolar disorder and schizophrenia share some 
psychopathological clusters, a reasonable hypothesis 
is that the same assumption may be valid in both 
cases. This inference is strengthened by the fact 
that ToM-related issues addressed in studies that 
involve these disorders are almost identical. Today, 
psychopathological clusters are addressed as domains 
and not as an unambiguous feature of a specific 
mental disorder (Maia & Frank, 2011). Consequently, 
cognitive impairments in some major mental illnesses 
may be the result of common abnormal brain function 
rather than dysfunction of brain regions specific to one 
disorder (Maia & Frank, 2011).
The first ToM studies of schizophrenia were 
reported during the early 1990s. Despite the large 
amount of evidence accumulated during this period 
that suggested ToM impairments in this disorder, 
it is unclear whether these impairments may occur 
separately from global cognitive decline. Also 
uncertain is how they might fluctuate with acuity or 
chronicity (Brüne, 2005). First-degree relatives of 
patients with schizophrenia usually perform poorly in 
social cognition tasks compared with healthy controls 
(Janssen, Krabbendam, Jolles, & van Os, 2003; Mazza, 
Di Michele, Pollice, Casacchia, & Roncone, 2008). 
An assessment that involved adolescents who were 
genetically at high risk for schizophrenia showed 
social skill impairments but no ToM deficits (Gibson, 
Penn, Prinstein, Perkins, & Belger, 2010). The extent 
of the association between ToM abilities and real-
world functional outcomes in schizophrenia remains 
inconclusive (Couture, Granholm, & Fish, 2011; 
Sparks, McDonald, Lino, O’Donnell, & Green, 2010).
Social cognition status among subjects with bipolar 
disorder is even less clear, and available data on this 
matter are scarce. Also unclear is whether the ToM 
deficits observed in studies of patients who experience 
manic or depressive episodes remain after acute phase 
remission (Kerr, Dunbar, & Bentall, 2003; Olley, Malhi, 
Bachelor, Cahill, Mitchell, & Berk, 2005). Nonsocial 
cognition may also be a confounding factor in bipolar 
disorder. One study reported no significant difference 
in the performance on ToM tasks between euthymic 
patients and healthy controls after correction analysis 
for executive function deficits (Bora et al., 2005). 
Assessment of Theory of Mind
Theory of Mind assessment continues to develop 
(Bora, Yucel, & Pantelis, 2009; Sprong, Schothorst, 
Vos, Hox, & van Engeland, 2007). The tests and tasks 
already developed often focus on clinical populations in 
which the performance would be inferior to the general 
population (Bora et al., 2009; Bosco, Colle, De Fazio, 
Bono, Ruberti, & Tirassa, 2009; Brüne & Brüne-Cohrs, 
2006). The main challenge of ToM assessment is the 
conceptual divergence in the understanding of this 
function (Meltzoff, 1999; Sprong et al., 2007) reflected 
by the various tools used to evaluate ToM. Because 
of this divergence, the literature includes studies that 
utilized a variety of tests, tasks, and assessment methods 
for ToM (Brüne & Brüne-Cohrs, 2006).
The simplest test that was developed in the first stage 
of ToM research was the false-belief paradigm, which 
measures an individual’s ability to recognize the false 
beliefs of others (Brüne & Brüne-Cohrs, 2006; Müller & 
Liebermann, 2004; Sprong et al., 2007). In one example, 
a famous singer is on tour and is coming to your city for a 
performance scheduled for next Sunday. On Wednesday, 
however, you hear on the radio that the show has been 
rescheduled for next week. Your friend suggests that you 
should go together to the show this week. You recognize 
that your friend has a false belief (i.e., he/she thinks the 
performance is still scheduled on Sunday), and you know 
your friend thinks this because he/she did not hear the 
news that the show has been rescheduled.
The two most common tests that use this paradigm 
are the Sally-and-Anne Test and the Smarties Test. 
The Sally-and-Anne Test is a classic task developed 
by Wimmer & Perner (1983) in which a situation 
is presented to a participant who has to predict the 
behavior of a character using information contained 
in a short story. This simple test is useful for assessing 
the capacity of “metarepresentation.” Children under 
4 years of age usually have poor results, most likely 
because they cannot understand false beliefs (Brüne 
& Brüne-Cohrs, 2006). The Smarties Test assesses 
the ability of a child to notice an individual’s false 
beliefs. Perner, Frith, Leslie, & Leekman (1989) 
developed a scenario in which the participant is 
offered three boxes of a specific item such as cookies. 
However, the boxes actually contain a different item 
such as scissors. The participant is then asked what 
an individual who they do not know would think was 
inside the box. Other tasks, in addition to the Smarties 
Test and Sally-and-Anne Test, utilize the false-belief 
paradigm. Examples include Happé’s Strange Stories 
(Happé, 1994), false-belief picture sequencing (Brüne 
& Bodenstein, 2005), Subjective ToM Assessment 
(Duval, Piolino, Bejanin, Eustache, & Desgranges, 
2010), the Maxi Test (Wimmer & Perner, 1983), 
False-Belief Stories (Frith & Corcoran, 1996), and 
the ToM Test (Muris et al., 1999).
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After the development of these instruments, more 
sophisticated paradigms such as metaphor, irony, and 
faux pas were developed (Brüne & Brüne-Cohrs, 2006; 
Frith & Corcoran, 1996; Muris et al., 1999). These 
paradigms also involve a variety of tests and tasks, which 
usually use stories that involve double-bluff, mistakes, 
persuasion, or white lies (Happé, 1994). Presenting the 
stimuli with cartoons is common. In one meta-analysis 
performed by Bora et al. (2009), the Hinting Test had 
greater statistical results than the other tests that used 
stories with higher-order false beliefs. In the Hinting 
Test, the participant has to understand the meaning of 
a story, but the stimuli are presented in indirect speech 
(Frith & Corcoran, 1996). Happé (1994) developed the 
Theory of Mind Advanced Test, which is composed of 
stories and drawings. Following the presentation of a 
story, the participant is asked to answer a series of open-
ended questions. The test is a useful measure of healthy 
subjects compared with autistic patients.
Because the cognitive understanding of ToM also 
extends to other abilities (Sabbagh, Moulson, & Harkness, 
2004), theorists developed tests that measure the capacity 
to read others to understand an emotional state by reading 
the eyes or facial cues (Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Hill, 
Raste, & Plumb, 2001). This paradigm involves more 
automatic skills, and it has been called socioperceptual 
or mental state decoding (Bora, Eryavuz, Kayahan, 
Sungu, & Veznedaroglu, 2006; Gokcen, Bora, Erermis, 
Kesikci, & Aydin, 2009; Sabbagh et al., 2004). In the 
Face Test (Adolphs, 2002), the participant is asked to 
look at a picture of a face and name which of seven basic 
emotions it represents (i.e., happiness, fear, surprise, 
disgust, sadness, anger, and distress). Composed of 36 
pictures, the Eyes Test is used to test for the decoding 
of mental states. The adaptation of Baron-Cohen (2001) 
has 27 pictures and has been utilized in several scientific 
studies (Gokcen et al., 2009). The test asks the subject to 
name the mental state of the person in the picture, and the 
picture shows just the eye region.
In addition to these paradigms and tests, examiners 
also use subjective assessment, which is generally 
performed using scales. Development of the scales 
is done with aspects of or questions from other 
interviews (Duval et al., 2010). The best example is 
the Theory of Mind Assessment Scale (Bosco et al., 
2009; Wellman, & Liu, 2004).
Conclusion
Many unresolved questions remain regarding 
the relationship between major psychiatric disorders 
such as schizophrenia and bipolar disorder, and social 
cognition, independent from global executive function. 
However, some points have become clear with recent 
studies. Measures of ToM may not always reflect the 
same ability when the assessment tools (e.g., the Eye Test 
and faux pas) are different, and it may not necessarily 
engage the same faculties and brain networks. Many of 
these tasks have odd paradigms that utilize false-belief 
tasks and assess emotion recognition. A report from the 
U.S. National Institute of Mental Health workshop on 
social cognition in schizophrenia established that future 
key research topics should address the factor structure 
within social cognition, the relationship between it and 
basic cognition, and alternative assessment approaches. 
This report pointed to the future tendency of identifying 
the timing of social cognitive impairment in relation 
to the disorder’s longitudinal course and connection 
between social cognition and neural circuits (Green 
et al., 2008). Studies indicated severe ToM deficits in 
autistic and schizophrenic patients beyond the tendency 
of other mental disorders to likely have impairments in 
ToM or social cognition. An article from the International 
Society for Bipolar Disorder proposed a battery for 
cognitive assessment. The authors concluded that social 
cognition is increasingly implicated in bipolar disorder 
and suggested that new studies should evaluate the tests 
that assess this disorder (Yatham et al., 2010). Even with 
scarce empirical studies, social cognition should follow 
the same trajectory of neurodevelopment.
The findings suggest that an effective mental 
treatment cannot be obtained without addressing 
collective behavior. Humans are essentially a social 
species. The clarification of these issues is a crucial step 
toward developing an intervention that is capable of 
mitigating social cognition impairments.
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